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Abstract
This article discusses the recent call within contemporary phenomenology to return to subjectivity 
in response to certain limitations of naturalistic explanations of the mind. The meaning and 
feasibility of this call is elaborated by connecting it to a classical issue within the phenomenological 
tradition concerning the possibility of investigating the first-person perspective through reflection. 
We will discuss how this methodological question is respectively treated and reconfigured in the 
works of Natorp, Husserl, and Lacan. Finally, we will lay out some possible consequences of 
such a cross-reading for the conception of subjectivity and the concomitant effort to account for 
this dimension of first-person experience in response and in addition to its omission within the 
standard third-person perspective of psychological research.
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In recent years we have witnessed a resurgence of the issue of subjectivity in different 
research domains ranging from cognitive (neuro)science and analytic philosophy of mind 
to psychopathology and the so-called consciousness studies. One of the central impetuses 
for this return to subjectivity is related to a growing awareness on the part of philosophers 
and scientists alike, working within these various related research domains, of a certain 
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dissatisfaction with what is widely considered to be the dominant paradigm in the theori-
zation of the mind from the 1960s onwards: that is, cognitive science. Although it was 
initially expected that cognitive science would fulfill Hume’s famous ambition to become 
“the Newton of mental phenomena,” many researchers nowadays agree that some foun-
dational issues still stand in need of further clarification (Parnas, Sass, & Zahavi, 2013). 
Preeminent among these issues is the relation between, on the one hand, cognitive descrip-
tions of the mind’s functioning, typically conceived as some kind of “information pro-
cessing” activity within our black box, responsible for generating various kinds of 
cognitive behavior and, on the other hand, subjectivity, loosely defined throughout the 
literature in the phenomenological sense as “what it is like” to be a cognizing mind, the 
way things are or appear from a subject’s point of view. Moreover, the core of the argu-
ment that is raised against cognitive science is that it suffers from an “explanatory gap” 
vis-à-vis subjectivity; that although it has provided us with ever-increasing complex 
descriptions of the cognitive dimension of the mind “as it is in itself,” it nevertheless fails 
to account precisely for how “this mind” appears to itself, how the functioning of the mind 
is experienced subjectively. Or, in the concise wording of Roy, Petitot, Pachaud, and 
Varela (1999), “explaining what is happening in [emphasis added] the black box is not 
explaining what is happening for [emphasis added] the black box” (p. 12). According to 
advocates of this explanatory gap argument, it is thus one thing to try to account for what 
is going on in our brain—at whatever level of explanation, whether neurobiologically or 
functionally defined—when we engage in various kinds of cognitive behavior (e.g., mem-
ory, perception, attention), and another thing to try to account for what appears or seems 
to be going on when we engage in those types of behavior from a first-person point of 
view. Hence, what the core of the explanatory gap argument vis-à-vis the current status of 
cognitive science amounts to can be succinctly formalized as follows: (a) cognitive sci-
ence purports to give a complete account of the cognitive mind; (b) an essential feature of 
creatures endowed with such a cognitive mind is that they have the capacity for phenom-
enality: in clear contradistinction with tables or stones, there is something “it is like” to be 
a cognitive agent; (c) cognitive science does not attempt or (up until now) fails to account 
for this subjective dimension; and (d) hence, in its current status, cognitive science is 
incomplete and found wanting with respect to (a).
As a consequence, it has been argued repeatedly that a mere functional analysis of the 
inner workings of the mind does not provide an exhaustive nor an adequate explanation 
as long as the first-person dimension of subjective experience is not taken into considera-
tion as an explicit area of investigation (Flanagan, 1992; Parnas et al., 2013; Strawson, 
1997). In short, the phenomenological critique vis-à-vis current cognitive research prac-
tice is that—insofar as it is aiming at a full-fledged naturalistic explanation of the mind—
it has to take the subjective dimension seriously as a central part of the explanandum. If 
not, the whole naturalistic endeavor will be question-begging from the very start.
In light of this explanatory gap and the concomitant phenomenological argument, 
several authors have argued for a return to classical phenomenological approaches of 
subjectivity in hopes of enhancing our understanding of the relation between cognitive 
processes and their phenomenal manifestations (Gallagher, 2002; Gallagher & Varela, 
2001; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). According to these authors, phenomenology, as origi-
nated in the work of Husserl and subsequently developed by, for example, Heidegger, 
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Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, could provide us with a refined theory and description of 
subjectivity as the necessary requirement prior to the effort of “bridging the gap.” 
Leaving aside the delicate question of whether phenomenology could indeed take up a 
preconfigured role as a supplement to a naturalistic explanation of the mind (see De 
Preester, 2006; Rinofner-Kreidl, 2005; Zahavi, 2010), and rather than immediately 
assuming that phenomenology provides us with a clear-cut and unproblematic descrip-
tion of subjectivity which is hence ready to be transposed to other research domains, the 
purpose of the present article is to investigate some problems that reside within the phe-
nomenological effort to investigate subjectivity itself. Moreover, we will revisit a classi-
cal problem in the phenomenological tradition with regard to the conditions for 
phenomenology as a first-person description of subjective experience related to the fol-
lowing question: is it possible to investigate subjectivity reflectively? This is how we will 
proceed.
First we will present Natorp’s challenge to a phenomenological approach as a reflec-
tive investigation of subjectivity in his Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode 
from 1912. According to Natorp’s classical argument, every effort to grasp subjectivity 
by means of reflection is always a step too late vis-à-vis subjective experience as it is 
lived before this reflection. This will lead him to deny the possibility of attaining a direct 
access to subjective experience and to refiguring his method as a reconstruction with 
subjectivity hence considered as an unattainable limit-case.
Next we will explore Husserl’s answer to Natorp’s critique of reflective phenomenol-
ogy as laid out in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy (1913/1983). Contra Natorp, Husserl will defend the phenomenological 
method of reduction as being based on direct evidence concerning the description of 
lived experience in its intentional functioning. This method, Husserl claims in 1913, is in 
no way indirect or reconstructive, yet directly based on evidence as obtained in phenom-
enological reflection.
Finally, we will shed a new light on the debate between Natorp and Husserl concern-
ing the status of phenomenological reflection by relating it to the distinction Lacan draws 
in his 11th seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis between “the 
subject of enunciation” and “the subject of the utterance” (1964/1977). As will become 
clear, Lacan’s minimal conceptual apparatus is an alternative way of writing Natorp’s 
and Husserl’s ongoing debate concerning the relation between subjectivity and objectiv-
ity and as such it will prove helpful to tackle our question regarding the possibility of 
investigating subjectivity by means of phenomenological reflection and to lay out some 
consequences of this cross-reading for the contemporary debate on the explanatory gap 
and the consequent call for a return to subjectivity.
Natorp’s critical psychology: Subjectivation versus 
objectivation
The main goal of the so-called Neo-Kantian Marburg School—with Cohen, Natorp, and 
Cassirer as its main representatives—was the further development of the transcendental 
project as initially laid down by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. In line with the 
Neo-Kantian project, the transcendental method was envisioned to elucidate, as the 
 at Bibliotheek fac Psych en on January 28, 2016tap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
756 Theory & Psychology 25(6) 
Marburgers called it, “the logic” of objective knowledge (Erkenntnislogik), in other 
words, it seeks to give a logical justification for the a priori conditions that govern the 
construction of objective reality through subjective, cognizing acts (Kim, 2007). 
According to this transcendental view, it is in science that objective reality is constructed 
through cognizing activities, whereas it is the proper task of transcendental philosophy 
to clarify the a priori conditions that govern this construction. More precisely, Marburg 
Neo-Kantianism set out from the fact of mathematized natural science (Cohen’s Faktum 
der Wissenschaften, 1977), that is, science’s progressive determination of an objective 
order as it is presumed to appear through or in sensible phenomena, via a method of 
hypothesizing laws that are “valid” (gültig) or “hold” (gelten) these phenomena, in order 
to inquire subsequently into the a priori conditions that factor into this construction of 
objective reality and which hence could explain how such a constructive determination 
is attained. As such, the goal of the Marburg logic was to determine, by means of an 
analytic reconstruction of thinking’s synthetic construction of objectivities, how scien-
tific thinking lawfully generates or synthesizes the unities that are its objects of knowl-
edge. It is consequently in science’s progressive objectifications that we can find 
subjectivity at work, where it is seized as the lawful activity in accordance with which 
the subsequent hypothesizing of science occurs.
The interesting addition of Natorp to this standard picture of the transcendental 
project and at the same time the problematic nexus running through both his Allgemeine 
Psychologie (1912) and his discussion with Husserl, is that not only cognizing activity 
in science is objectifying; subjective life as such is objectifying, whether it leads 
towards objective knowledge or not. According to Natorp, this becomes most clear in 
subjective enunciations in that they always claim some-thing. As such, every expres-
sion (Äußerung) is an objectifying externalization (Entäußerung) vis-à-vis subjective 
experience before the utterance (Natorp, 1912, p. 99). As Natorp explains, this is the 
character of “objectifying cognizing (Erkentniss), scientific as well as pre-scientific: 
… to make objects out of appearances (Erscheinungen)” (1912, p. 193, our transla-
tion). But if it is characteristic for all reflections to make objects out of appearances, 
what consequence will this have on the study of subjectivity as such? If all subjective 
acts (reflection, judgments, enunciations, etc.) in one way or another objectify this 
pristine (ursprünglich) subjectivity, it is both obvious and inevitable that the acts per-
taining to the study of subjectivity will be objectifying too. According to Natorp, 
whereas everything else can be made into an object (Gegenstand) of reflection, the 
subject as such eludes this reflection (nicht sich selber Gegenstand sein). The moment 
we start to investigate subjectivity reflectively, we transform it into its very opposite. 
Therefore, in reflection, the subject of consciousness necessarily makes way for an 
object of consciousness.1 Furthermore, according to Natorp, this transcendental clari-
fication with regard to the limits of reflection has important repercussions for the dis-
cipline par excellence that ought to be devoted to the scientific study of subjectivity, 
that is, psychology. To the extent that psychology is a discipline devoted to disclosing 
scientific facts about subjectivity, it treats its object in the same objectifying way as 
other scientific disciplines do with regard to their respective objects of study and it will 
subsequently disregard the ontological difference that set subjectivity apart from 
objectivity. In so doing, the particular element that makes up for the subjectivity of the 
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subject and that is concomitantly the actual raison d’être of psychology as a scientific 
field of study in the first place—the dynamic, concrete, fluctuating life of subjective 
experience—is lost. As Natorp adds in a Hegelian way, that which makes the subject a 
subject is “killed,” mortified under its objectifying representations (1912, p. 191). All 
traditional psychology supposedly proceeds in this way: according to Natorp psychol-
ogy “kills subjectivity in order to dissect it, and believes the life of the soul is on dis-
play in the result of the dissection” (1912, pp. 102–103).
So far Natorp’s conclusion with regard to the possibility of investigating subjectivity 
has not been very optimistic. Since every effort to investigate subjectivity amounts to an 
objectifying Entäußerung of its point of departure, what other options do we have? The 
title of Natorp’s 1912 work—Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode—never-
theless seems to suggest that there is a “critical method,” able to overcome the pitfalls of 
traditional psychology which merely deals with the subjective as a factual state of psy-
chic affairs. Indeed, this is the task Natorp sets out for his “transcendental psychology.” 
It became clear earlier that the method of this transcendental psychology should allow 
for a clarification of subjectivity that is not objectifying, one that doesn’t construct an 
object out of subjective appearances. Hence, Natorp suggests we will never be able to do 
justice to the ontological difference if we operate within an object-oriented methodologi-
cal monism, put differently: ontological difference should be met by methodological dif-
ference. Therefore, whereas, according to a transcendental perspective, objectivity is 
attained by a construction of objective idealities out of the immediate flux of subjective 
appearances, subjectivity should be investigated by going back from these objectifica-
tions to the immediateness of subjective appearances by a method of reconstruction. 
Methodologically speaking, reconstruction should therefore be regarded as the inverse 
method of objectification, the “turning inside out” (Umstülpung) of its constructive 
effects towards that from which reality is progressively built up in the first place: the 
concrete and dynamic conscious life of the subject (Natorp, 1912, p. 20). In a phenom-
enological vein, Natorp also speaks of the immediate in consciousness as “phenomena” 
and explicitly uses the term “reduction” for his reconstructive move:
Thus for all spheres, scientific representations as well as unscientific representations such as 
fantasy, but also the regions of feeling, desiring and willing, the same task is posed, [namely] 
that of a reduction of the always already and in some way or other objectified representation to 
the immediate of consciousness. (Natorp, 1888, p. 89)
To summarize, Natorp’s insistence on the ontological difference between subjectivity 
and objectivity leads him to deny the possibility of investigating subjectivity in a reflex-
ive and thus methodologically monist way. Since by necessity, reflection—and by exten-
sion every subjective act—follows the constructive path of objectifying the immediacy 
of fluctuating subjective phenomena, a direct description of subjective life through a 
reflective grasp is considered unattainable and therefore should be substituted for a ret-
roactive subjectivation as a “reverse teleology” (Luft, 2010, p. 225).2 Ultimately, how-
ever, according to Natorp, the dimension of pure subjectivity as the immediacy of 
conscious phenomena remains an unreachable ideal and will hence forever elude our 
grasp (1912, p. 233).
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Husserl’s response: “The principle of all principles”
One does not have to be an erudite phenomenologist to see that Natorp’s methodological 
reservations concerning the possibility of a direct description of subjective experience 
through reflection depart significantly from phenomenology’s modus operandi with 
regard to its field of study. A common way to define phenomenology is determining its 
task as a description of our lived experience as it is given, precisely in the way it is given, 
in its pre-theoretical immediacy. Indeed, as Husserl famously holds in his Ideas I: “the 
principle of all principles” which grounds phenomenology as an eidetic enterprise—as a 
pure description of the essential (eidetic) structures of consciousness—is that it builds 
upon that which is present “in self-giving evidence and intuition” (1913/1983, p. 44). 
Therefore, Natorp’s challenge vis-à-vis phenomenology as a reflective investigation of 
subjectivity is leveled at nothing other than what Husserl—from the publication of his 
Logical Investigations (1970b) in 1901 onwards—considered its most basic methodo-
logical principle, namely that of reflexive intuition which brings phenomena to clear and 
apodictic evidence. As Husserl explains in the section, Critical Excursis: Phenomenology 
and the Difficulties of “Self-Observation,” in response to similar challenges to his reflec-
tive paradigm as those raised by Natorp:
The phenomena of reflection are, in fact, a sphere of pure and possibly perfectly clear data. It 
is an eidetic insight [emphasis added], always attainable because immediate, that starting from 
the objectively given as objective reflection on the presentive consciousness and its subject is 
always possible: starting from the perceived, from what is “there ‘in person’,” a reflection on 
the perceiving; starting from the remembered, just as it “hovers before us” as remembered, as 
“having been,” a reflection on the remembering; starting from the statement in the flowing off 
of its being given, a reflection on the stating [emphasis added], etc. It is evident that by virtue 
of its essence – … something such as consciousness and consciousness-content … is cognizable 
by reflection. (Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 187)
So for Husserl, the possibility of grasping subjectivity by means of reflection is indispen-
sable for the methodological grounding of phenomenology to its subject matter. It is 
furthermore essential for, so to speak, properly essential reasons: reasons pertaining to 
the essence of consciousness itself as revealed in eidetic insight. Let us be precise here 
with regard to Husserl’s more or less Cartesian argumentation: according to Husserl, it is 
“countersensical” to deny phenomenology’s “principle of all principles” and thus also to 
doubt the givenness of subjective processes and their accessibility through reflection, 
since this doubt itself would again be asserted from the initial givenness of reflective 
intuition. Doubts concerning the possibility of a reflective investigation of subjectivity 
thus “always-already” presuppose knowledge of the so-called “reflectionally unmodi-
fied mental processes” which is at the same time and erroneously placed into question 
(Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 185). Consequently, the methodological critique concerning the 
possibility of reflective intuition culminates according to Husserl in doubting the possi-
bility of claiming anything whatsoever on the basis of reflectionally presentive intuition 
and is thus essentially self-refuting. As Husserl contends:
All genuine skepticism of whatever kind and persuasion is indicated by the essentially necessary 
countersense that, in its argumentations, it implicitly presupposes as conditions of the possibility 
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of its validity what it denies in its theses. … He who also says: I doubt the cognitive signification 
of reflection, asserts a countersense. For as he declares his doubt, he reflects, and setting down 
this statement as valid presupposes that reflection actually and without doubt (scl. for the cases 
present) has the cognitive value doubted, that it does not change the relation to something 
objective, that the reflectionally unmodified mental process does not forfeit its essence in the 
transition to reflection. (Husserl, 1913/1983, pp. 185–186)
Phenomenology’s methodological procedure of reflective intuition is in sum not a con-
sequence of any strategic or methodological argumentation which transcends the strin-
gent limits of “immediate intuition” within conscious experience, but is for Husserl 
essentially grounded and given as something obvious within the confines of absolute 
consciousness itself.
However, as might have become clear from the foregoing, the foundational principle 
that grounds phenomenology as a reflective investigation of subjectivity does not entail 
just any intuition. As Husserl explains: “Of course reflection can be effected by anyone 
and anyone can bring consciousness within the sphere of his seizing regard” (1913/1983, 
p. 114). Rather than simply directing the introspective gaze at ourselves and describing 
what is or is not presented there, phenomenology, by contrast, wants to disclose “a new 
region of being never before delimited in its own peculiarity” (Husserl, 1913/1983, 
p. 63). This new region of being, which will become the fundamental field of phenome-
nological investigation, is the field of “pure consciousness,” “the sphere of being of 
absolute origins” (Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 129), which is allegedly only seized upon by 
phenomenological reflection. But now the obvious question suggests itself: if this pur-
portedly new region of being is the field of consciousness, why not turn to the empirical 
findings psychology discloses about this object of study? In what way does this sphere 
of absolute consciousness differ from the region that is supposed to be already well 
known, that of the mind or the psyche, which is extensively dealt with by its own regional 
science, that of psychology? This is of course an important question for Husserl not least 
because he was especially concerned that phenomenology would not be confused with 
any kind of psychology whatsoever. Since Husserl’s answer to this question is as well-
known as it is contested—especially in the discussion on the alleged (non)sense/(im)
possibility of a naturalized phenomenology we briefly considered in our introduction—
we will only sketch out the main points we will need for our present inquiry. The princi-
pal reason why, according to Husserl, “pure phenomenology is not psychology” 
(1913/1983, p. xix) has nothing to do with accidental delimitations of its field of study, 
that is, in the same way as “physics is not psychology” because it treats another “prov-
ince of reality,” nor is this faithful separation between phenomenology and psychology 
altered by the seemingly obvious fact that both have to do with consciousness. What 
prevents phenomenology from being reduced to psychology, an empirical science deal-
ing with psychological “matters of fact,” is that the latter merely deals with conscious-
ness or subjectivity as real, actually existing occurrences belonging to real empirical 
subjects in the spatiotemporal world as absolute reality (1913/1983, p. xx). As such, 
psychology operates from within the naturalistic attitude wherein the givenness of the 
actual empirical reality of its object of study—in casu consciousness, psychic reality, 
behavior, …—is always-already tacitly assumed and accepted as pre-existing in a world 
where things just are what they are, independent of the performative consciousness of the 
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empirical psychologist as scientific investigator of Nature. It is mainly because of this 
attitude that Husserl turns away from what he calls “that philosophical poverty in which, 
under the fine name of a world view founded on natural science, we are vainly fatiguing 
ourselves” (1913/1983, p. 115). On the one hand, psychology is precisely a “philosophi-
cal poverty” because it only studies consciousness as a component part of Nature and 
does not reflect on the conditions of possibility of its givenness. Psychology merely takes 
this givenness of consciousness as an object of scientific inquiry for granted without 
effectively inquiring how this is possible, without answering the transcendental question 
of the constitutional conditions of its own object of experience, a question which is nev-
ertheless indispensable for grounding and justifying its scientific activity. Or, to slightly 
reduce the foregoing formulations, psychology only treats consciousness as an object in 
the world, in the sense of a “part-whole” relation, and not as a subject for the world, in 
the sense of a “constituting-constituted” relation. We are, on the other hand, “vainly 
fatiguing ourselves” if the effort to present a phenomenological clarification of pure 
consciousness is once again confused with an investigation of Nature since the latter, as 
intentional correlate of meaning bestowing consciousness within the a priori correlation 
between “constituting subjectivity – constituted objectivity,” depends for its sense as a 
transcendent objective unity precisely on the constitutional acts of pure consciousness. 
This does not mean however that something is “wrong” with psychology, nor with the 
other sciences that operate within this attitude, as long as we understand its scientific 
activity and its accomplishments as, indeed, always starting from and situated in this 
attitude. On the contrary, Husserl recognizes in this “uncritical presupposition” one of 
the pillars that carries the success of those sciences (Husserl, 1925/1997, p. 191). 
Husserl’s point is simply that, when aspiring to understand the “general thesis” itself—
the experiential fact of there-being-a-world-for-us—psychology does not have anything 
to tell us, nor does any other science that studies objects in this given world. To schema-
tize the foregoing argument: if it is (a) the task of transcendental phenomenology to 
understand the thesis of the naturalistic attitude—this is its explanandum—and if (b) the 
sciences always already operate from the presupposition and pre-givenness of this 
explanandum, then it follows that (c) phenomenology should avoid any reference to 
those sciences because otherwise (d) elements from the explanandum would reappear in 
the phenomenological elucidation of the explanans. According to Husserl, this would 
amount to what he calls “the transcendental circle, which consists in presupposing some-
thing as beyond question when in fact it is encompassed by the all-inclusiveness of that 
very question (Husserl, 1925/1997, pp. 249–250).
Thus, like Natorp, Husserl stresses the necessity of a radically different approach to 
consciousness, one that does not conflate subjectivity and objectivity but is instead able 
to reckon with this ontological difference on a methodological level. Since, from a tran-
scendental phenomenological perspective objective reality is only possible and compre-
hensible as an intentional unity within the confines of a transcendentally pure 
consciousness, the phenomenological clarification of subjectivity should accordingly 
shift from an object-oriented to a subject-oriented investigation of consciousness. This 
is indeed the role to be played by, in a first movement, the famous phenomenological 
epoché through which the thesis of the natural attitude is “bracketed” or “put out of 
action” in order to avoid us relying on knowledge obtained within this attitude to tackle 
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the question of constitution (i.e., on pains of the “transcendental circle”) and to get a 
clear picture of the phenomenon that we would like to explain, that is, the world as it 
appears to me in my experience. However, in itself, the epoché does not explain any-
thing with regard to the question of world-constitution. It is only, in Husserl’s words, 
“the gate of entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new 
world of pure subjectivity” (1970a, p. 260). Passing through that door, we have arrived 
at the second methodological movement, that of the phenomenological or transcenden-
tal reduction, through which we are led back (Latin: reducere) from the constituted 
world—as it manifests itself as object-pole within my intentional experience—to that 
“place” where the world constitutes itself in its givenness-for-me, that is, transcendental 
subjectivity. In this way, the world placed within brackets functions as the transcenden-
tal guiding clue (Leitfaden) starting from which the constitution-question can be pur-
sued in a reflexive way:
Starting from the experiential world given beforehand as existent and … from any experiential 
world whatever, conceived as given beforehand as existent, we exercised transcendental 
reduction—that is: we went back to the transcendental ego, who constitutes within himself 
givenness-beforehand and all modes of subsequent givenness. (Husserl, 1960, p. 136)
To summarize: according to Husserl, an adequate, reflective description of subjectiv-
ity is possible if one refrains from conceiving it as a natural object. Through phenomeno-
logical reduction, a radically different perspective on subjectivity is attained, one that is 
committed to the radical opposition between (constituting) subjectivity and (constituted) 
objectivity, both of which are related to each other in a transcendental “correlational a 
priori” and accessible to phenomenological reflection.
Natorp and Husserl reconsidered
Two provisional points should be presented at this stage with regard to this preliminary 
outline of Husserl’s phenomenology and its relation to Natorp’s challenge of a reflective 
investigation of subjectivity.
First, Husserl fully agrees with Natorp’s critique of psychology as being a discipline 
ill-suited to treat its subject matter in a methodologically appropriate way. Indeed, this 
viewpoint can be found throughout Husserl’s complete writings. He reiterates his cri-
tique of psychology, for the sake of an example, much later in The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: “Natural human understanding and the 
objectivism rooted in it will view every transcendental philosophy as a flighty eccentric-
ity, its wisdom as useless foolishness; or it will interpret it as psychology which seeks to 
convince itself that it is not psychology” (1970a, p. 200). Thus, like Natorp, Husserl 
rejects psychology since it is, and will be, unable to teach us anything about the proper 
essence of subjectivity because of two closely related reasons. On the one hand, psychol-
ogy remains stuck in the naïveté of the naturalistic attitude and consequently fails to 
recognize the difference between transcendental subjectivity and mundane empirical 
subjectivity. On the other hand, and as a direct consequence of the first, it has conceived 
of its object (the “psyche” or the “soul”) as something real, similar to any object of the 
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natural sciences, and hence follows the path of an objectivistic science more geometrico. 
In contrast, Husserl resists any characterization of subjectivity in terms used for the char-
acterization of physical objects and hence considers its study according to the methods 
of natural science a category mistake.
Second, however, it is questionable if Husserl’s reconfiguring of phenomenology as a 
transcendental investigation of subjectivity really solves the radical nature of Natorp’s 
critique. Let us recall that Natorp’s critique is in the first place a methodological one, 
aiming for phenomenology as grounded in reflective intuition. Although it may well be 
the case that phenomenology no longer considers subjectivity along the lines of the natu-
ral sciences, that it attains a transcendental outlook on absolute consciousness and that it 
refrains from naturalizing it through the phenomenological reduction, the question 
remains if it is consequently able to avert Natorp’s logic according to which, “every 
Aüsserung is an Entaüsserung,” that is, according to which, “subjectivity is objectifying 
as such.” Even more so, to the extent that the description of the by now phenomenologi-
cally reduced “pure consciousness” still rests on the evidence-paradigm of reflective 
intuition, and that the possibility of this description is essential for grounding phenome-
nology as the transcendental “science of all sciences,” the question with regard to the 
ability of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to stand up against Natorp’s chal-
lenge retains its force, even, maybe especially, within the transcendental domain. As 
Zahavi explains, with respect to the importance for phenomenology as a reflective enter-
prise of clarifying this problematic within the transcendental domain, “To deny that tran-
scendental subjectivity manifests itself is to deny the possibility of a phenomenological 
analysis of transcendental subjectivity. And to deny that is to deny the possibility of 
transcendental phenomenology altogether” (1999, p. 51). Indeed, we have seen that the 
task of a transcendental phenomenology is not merely restricted to a meticulous descrip-
tion of the appearance of the world in all its ontic diversity, but precisely to unearth the 
appearance qua appearance and its conditions of possibility. When we begin to study the 
distinguishing features of this appearing, we will notice that it is characterized by an 
intentional and dyadic structure: appearance is an appearance of something for someone. 
If we acknowledge this dyadic and intentional structure for the appearance of, for exam-
ple, tables and chairs, does it then equally hold for the manifestation of transcendental 
subjectivity itself? To put it differently: can the condition of appearance appear itself? 
Can that which forms the condition for phenomenal appearance also become a phenom-
enon in its own turn? Or do we have to reconstruct this dimension, as Natorp suggests, 
as that “what will have been” starting from the constituted objectivity?
Let us expand on this second point by relating this question to the distinction Husserl 
draws in his Ideas II between the “pure or transcendental Ego” and the “empirical Ego,” 
alternatively designated as the “empirical subject,” the “real psychic Ego,” or “I-as-man” 
(1952/1989, pp. 98–99). As argued by several authors (Bernet, Kern, & Marbach, 1993; 
Carr, 1999; Luft, 2010), the appearance of this distinction, and more specifically Husserl’s 
employment of the Kantian notion of the “transcendental or pure Ego,” is itself a conse-
quence of Husserl’s engagement with the Neo-Kantian tradition and a notable diver-
gence from his earlier work in the Logical Investigations. There, in the first edition of 
this work (1901–1902/1970b), Husserl had famously declared that he was “quite unable 
to find” what the Neo-Kantians (and especially Natorp) called the “pure Ego” (p. 92). 
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But then, later on, in a much-quoted footnote in the revised second edition of the Logical 
Investigations published in 1913, Husserl famously declared, partially in response to 
Natorp’s Einleitung in die Psychologie (1888), that he had “since managed to find it” 
(1913/1970b, p. 353) which, according to Husserl, becomes clear from the considerable 
analysis he devoted to the topic in the Ideas. Indeed, in clear contradistinction to his 
earlier opposition, here Husserl firmly argues that “everywhere the distinction must cer-
tainly be made between the objectified and the ‘originally’ not objectified pure Ego, e.g., 
between the perceived and the perceiving pure Ego” (1952/1989, p. 108). Or, that “we 
have to distinguish between the ‘I that I am’ on the subject side and the ‘I that I am’ as 
Object for myself, an Object which is, in the existing ‘I am,’ represented, constituted, and 
perhaps intended in the specific sense: the me” (Husserl, 1952/1989, p. 265).
Before continuing our analysis of what can be called the “pluralization of the Ego,” 
the obvious first question to be raised here concerns the meaning of Husserl’s delayed 
recourse to this distinction: why or where did Husserl eventually manage to find the pure 
Ego? Evidently, it would be quite absurd to assert that its sudden emergence would be the 
outcome of a painstaking investigation into the unknown depths of subjectivity where it 
suddenly announced itself in all its undeniable glory after having remained concealed 
from Husserl’s introspective gaze in the years before the Ideas. Nor should Husserl’s 
lucky retrieval of the Ego be confused with a delineation of the empirical conditions that 
are supposed to be fulfilled in order to give rise to consciousness, that is, the empirical 
person as bearer or ego of conscious experiences, since phenomenology, as we have 
already made clear, seeks to give an account of the essential structures of consciousness, 
regardless of the contingent question of which empirical bearer it belongs to. As several 
authors have noted (Bernet et al., 1993; Zahavi, 1999), the principal reason why Husserl 
eventually conceded to the Neo-Kantian postulation of the Ego and why he took into 
consideration, within the phenomenological reduction, the subjective orientation toward 
an I-subject of these reduced, pure, immanent experiences, was the difficulties that his 
initial non-egological theory encountered when it came to a phenomenological clarifica-
tion of the transcendental constitution of the Other. Indeed, an operational condition of 
possibility for an investigation of the mode of appearance of the Other within transcen-
dental consciousness is quite evidently that one operates with a theory of subjectivity 
which allows for a demarcation of my consciousness from that of another. But as long as 
Husserl’s phenomenological analysis restricted itself to an eidetic description of imma-
nent experiences “in a no man’s land,” that is, with the experience of “no one at all,” it 
proved unable to differentiate between the mode of appearance of my own experience 
and the experience of the Other as Other, as fundamentally characterized by its trans-
cendent alterity. In sum, it is precisely because conscious experience implies a subject of 
that experience (i.e., that is my experience), that a generalized transitivism is warded off 
within its phenomenological analysis.
If we now follow Husserl’s earlier incitation to differentiate between “the objectified 
and the ‘originally’ not objectified pure Ego,” (1952/1989, p. 108) the obvious Natorpian 
question to be raised here is consequently about the compatibility between Husserl’s 
methodological “principle of all principles” and this pure being of the Ego. Moreover, if 
we concede with Husserl that there is indeed more to an analysis of subjectivity than an 
empirical thematization of how I appear as a mundane entity, as a person or human being 
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who seems to be a causally determined thing among other things—in short: as an empiri-
cal Ego—the question remains if this is the only way in which I appear to myself as an 
object. As Husserl argues:
it is in no way correct to assert that the pure Ego is a subject that can never become an Object, 
as long as we do not limit the concept of Object at the very outset and in particular do not limit 
it to “natural” Objects, to mundane “real” Objects, for if we do, the assertion would indeed hold 
in a good and valid sense. (1913/1983, p. 107)
But indeed, let us, in accord with the prescriptions of the phenomenological epoché, not 
limit the concept of object with regard to the subjective life of the Ego to mundane or 
empirical objects, and instead, likewise in keeping with the phenomenological clarifica-
tion of objectivity, redefine the object as that which is intended within the transcendental 
“correlational a-priori.” How then do I appear to myself within this transcendentally 
reassessed field of appearance? Another way of posing this same question is by relating 
the issue of transcendental self-appearance to the outcome of phenomenological reflec-
tion within this same field of appearance: what is the effect of the reflectional act, by now 
understood as transcendental reflection, on the “I that I am on the subject side”? Does it 
remain unaltered throughout the transition from its pre-reflexive state of anonymous 
functioning to its subsequent thematization within the reflectional act? Or does the act of 
reflection, as Natorp argues, necessarily and inevitably involve a certain loss vis-à-vis 
subjectivity as it is lived before the reflection?
Having arrived at this central point of our discussion, it seems we are confronted with 
two remaining options with regard to the status of phenomenological reflection as the 
methodological gateway to investigating subjectivity.
First, phenomenological reflection does not alter the pre-reflexive givenness of the 
original, not objectified Pure Ego and is consequently able to grasp subjectivity in its 
transcendental functioning. Advocates of this view will either suggest that reflection, 
rather than being a falsifying mirror which transforms whatever it makes appear (to use 
Gashé’s Derridean phrase: reflection as entailing a “tain in the mirror”), should be 
regarded as a kind of “disclosing intensification” or “consummation” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/2002, p. 207) of the pre-reflexively lived experience, or they will appeal to a kind 
of hierarchization of the reflexive function in terms of a distinction between “pure” or 
“impure” (Sartre), “radical” and “less radical” (Merleau-Ponty), or “theoretical” and 
“hermeneutical” (Heidegger) forms of reflection. However, although it could be argued 
that one should make a distinction between, on the one hand, forms of reflection that 
explicitly reify and objectify their subject matter in the sense of a naturalistic reduction 
of subjectivity to the world as prima materia and, on the other hand, reflection in the 
sense of the phenomenological epoché, one nevertheless cannot argue that reflection as 
such simply repeats or continues whatever was already given before the reflection. For if 
this should be the case, why would we engage in this reflective procedure, whose explicit 
aim was to lift the dogmatic slumber of the naturalistic self-forgetfulness of subjectivity 
in the first place? Indeed, if phenomenological reflection simply rejoins what was already 
known in advance, it would be a superfluous methodological avatar only able to disclose 
its circular point of departure.
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Second, phenomenological reflection, although it might escape a naturalistic objecti-
fication of its subject matter, is itself confronted with what we called earlier “a pluraliza-
tion of the Ego”: a redoubling or splitting of the Ego between a subject of reflection and 
a reflected subject. As Asemissen points out, every reflexive thematization of subjectiv-
ity is necessarily marked by a self-fission or self-multiplication of the subject (1958/1959, 
p. 262) and, as Zahavi indicates, it is consequently characterized by an “internal division, 
difference and distance” (1999, p. 188). One of the important consequences of this is that 
reflection, even when purified from its worldly elements, will always and inevitably fall 
short with regard to subjectivity qua anonymously functioning subject-pole and hence 
will encounter in itself a structurally inscribed moment of “self-forgetfulness.” And 
although Husserl holds fast on his principle of all principles according to which phenom-
enology ought to ground its considerations exclusively on what is presented before it in 
phenomenological reflection, a similar conclusion can be drawn from his writings when 
he argues that, for example,
the ego that is the counterpart to everything is anonymous. It is not its own counterpart. The 
house is my counterpart, not vice versa. And yet I can turn my attention to myself. But then this 
in which the ego comes forward along with everything that was its counterpart is again split. 
The ego that comes forward as a counterpart and its counterpart [e.g., the house it was 
perceiving] are both counterparts to me. Forthwith, I—the subject of this new counterpart—am 
anonymous. (Husserl, 1931/1973, p. 2)
To conclude, although it is evident that there exists a decisive difference between a 
naturalistic and transcendental-phenomenological reflection at the level of their respec-
tive (non-) philosophical understandings of subjectivity (i.e., empirically delineated 
object-in-the-world vs. transcendental subject-for-the-world), at a more formal level—
that is, irrespective of their subsequent descriptive interpretations of subjectivity—both 
seem to be confronted with a structural moment of naïveté or forgetfulness which is 
operationally inscribed within the effort to capture subjectivity reflectively. And although, 
once again, the nature of what we are inclined to call a structural impossibility within the 
effort to return to subjectivity is of a very different status depending on a naturalistic or 
a phenomenological understanding, it is our contention that the dividing self-alienation 
which arises between the subject of reflection and the reflected subject, and the relation 
between both, is of crucial importance for every effort to delineate the essence of 
subjectivity.
In the following final section of this article we will examine how Lacan handles the 
question of this structural impossibility from the perspective of a psychoanalytic theory 
of subjectivity and, more in particular, how he does so by means of the distinction that he 
draws in his 11th Seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
between “the subject of enunciation” and “the subject of the utterance” (1964/1977).
The Lacanian split subject
Thus far our discussion of the phenomenological effort to return to subjectivity by means 
of a transcendentally reduced reflective investigation of consciousness has come across 
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a number of themes that can serve as subsequent points of entrance for our elucidation of 
Lacan’s position with respect to this problem. First, we have seen that both Natorp and 
Husserl, for closely related reasons, are critical of psychology understood as a special-
ized enterprise, among the numerous established empirical sciences, dedicated to the 
study of its own province of reality—the human psyche. Second, in spite of their shared 
rejection of psychology, Natorp and Husserl clearly differ when it comes to the outline 
of a methodological alternative which is able to meet psychology’s diagnosed shortcom-
ings. Natorp’s “critical method” tries to side-step the subject’s objectification by means 
of a genetic reconstructive attempt. Ultimately however, an immediate access to this 
original dimension is deemed structurally unattainable. For Husserl, by contrast, phe-
nomenology’s core methodological commitment is strictly linked to the possibility of a 
reflective thematization of subjectivity, although, as we have seen, the latter should be 
purified from its naturalistic remainders through the phenomenological epoché. 
Furthermore, and somewhat at odds with phenomenology’s methodological principle, 
we noted that the phenomenological reduction in its turn does not, so to speak, “reduce” 
the egological structure which pertains to every reflective act, namely the reflectively 
induced self-fission or splitting of the subject between an anonymous “subject of reflec-
tion,” on the one hand, and a thematically “objectified ego” as intended within the reflec-
tive act, on the other.
With regard to our first question—that is, Lacan’s appreciation of psychology consid-
ered as an empirical discipline dedicated to the scientific study of the human psyche—it 
is clear that, to a large extent, Lacan agrees with Natorp’s and Husserl’s critical reserva-
tions toward psychology and, more in particular, with its inadequacy to give a rigorous 
account of subjectivity. As Lacan contends in his 1960 piece The Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious, wherein he sets out his 
arguments against what he deems the positivistic self-conception of the sciences:
I shall take advantage of your kindness in assuming we agree that a science cannot be 
conditioned upon empiricism. Secondly, we encounter what has already been constituted, with 
a scientific label, by the name of psychology. Which I challenge—precisely because, as I will 
show, the function of the subject, as inaugurated by Freudian experience, disqualifies from the 
outset what, going by the name “psychology,” merely perpetuates an academic framework, no 
matter how one dresses up its premises. (1960/2006e, p. 672)
Lacan’s critique of what can be called, in line with Husserl, “psychology’s naturalistic 
self-understanding” is by now a familiar one: no matter how much psychology self-
confessedly asserts to rely solely on empirical data and unbiased observation, it never-
theless cannot function without a non-empirical foundation as its operational condition 
of possibility. For Lacan, psychology, in its attempt to don the clothing of the natural, 
observational sciences, feebly denies its necessary roots in a set of inadequately thema-
tized assumptions—its own disavowed “academic framework.” Any psychological 
school, in order to advance its empirical research, tacitly relies on a series of metaphysi-
cal (or, more properly, metapsychological) presuppositions—for example, a conception 
of the mind–body relation, an understanding of the subject–object distinction, a particu-
lar notion of what constitutes consciousness/experience, and so on. These meta-level 
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positions support the edifice of “what has already been constituted by the name of psy-
chology” (Lacan, 1960/2006e, p. 672), and yet because of its pretension to be grounded 
strictly in “the facts themselves” under the banner of its avowed “empiricism,” psychol-
ogy, according to Lacan, “tends to forget the circuitous path by which it came into being; 
otherwise stated, it forgets the dimension of truth that psychoanalysis seriously puts to 
work” (1966/2006d, p. 738). Hence, in a quote that could have been easily written by 
Husserl instead, Lacan concludes: “science, if one looks at it closely, has no memory” 
(1966/2006d, p.738). Moreover, and further pointing towards a principal agreement 
between Husserl and Lacan in their respective understanding of the relation between 
psychology and subjectivity, what is precisely forgotten by scientific psychology is, as 
Lacan contends, “the function of the subject” (1960/2006e, p. 672).
Lacan’s unremitting insistence on the function of the subject as being of central 
importance to his reworking of psychoanalytic theory in his famous retour à Freud may 
come as a surprise for both those who, on the one hand, tend to consider Freud’s notori-
ous “discovery” of the unconscious as sharply opposed and even antithetical to any phil-
osophical account which stresses the importance of the subject (as the much celebrated 
story goes, after Copernicus and Darwin, Freud delivered the third and most bitter blow 
to the subject’s narcissistic self-understanding when he showed that “the ego is not even 
master in its own house”) and, on the other hand, those who tend to downplay Lacan as 
a mere child of his time (e.g., Frank, 1989). That is, the time of a strict and fierce struc-
turalism that seemed to have done away with any notion of the subject whatsoever and 
once and for all assigned it to its proper place: namely, that of an imaginary epiphenom-
enon of an underlying determinative “a-subjective” structure functioning “behind” or 
“beneath” or “anterior” to the subject and at the same time rendering the subject the 
ignorant place of self-deception, blind to the structures of which it was essentially the 
outcome (Dolar, 1998). But if so, what then to think of Lacan’s call, after his insistence 
in the beginning of his teaching, on a “return to Freud” in order to avoid the misunder-
standings of the ego-psychological obfuscation of the Freudian heritage, for a second 
“return,” yet this time “to Descartes” (1946/2006c, p. 133)? Does this mean that Lacan 
eventually realized that Freud had perhaps been a little too hasty in his psychoanalytic 
burial of the self-conscious subject of German philosophy and consequently subscribed 
to that project with which we already became familiar through our reading of Natorp and 
Husserl?
As is the case with most philosophical questions worth pondering, the answer is not 
straightforward. Lacan has, nonetheless, an original take to offer with regard to the pos-
sibility to “return to subjectivity” as an alternative for the naturalistic and psychological 
objectifications, which was the second theme we deduced from the discussion between 
Natorp and Husserl. Moreover, in both his 11th Seminar (1964/1977) as in the Ecrits-
article, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious (1960/2006e), Lacan resumes the egological structure that was the outcome 
of the phenomenological reduction, that is, the field of tension surrounding the reflec-
tively induced self-fission of the subject between “subject of reflection – reflected sub-
ject,” albeit in structuralistic terms, as the difference between the “subject of enunciation” 
and the “subject of the utterance.” What is, according to Lacan, the relation between 
these two subjects and are we able to circumvent, through a yet unknown methodological 
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tour de force, the difference between both in order to accomplish the dazzling task set by 
both Natorp and Husserl of returning to our most pristine, lived subjectivity? According 
to Lacan, to put it very simply, we cannot. Moreover, Lacan confirms the irreducible dif-
ference between the “subject of enunciation,” which tries to represent itself by means of 
the diachronic chain of unfolding signifiers, and the “subject of the utterance,” which is 
to be regarded as the objectified sense-result of the linguistic closure or, to put it more 
technically, “punctuation” of the anticipated signification that was set in motion through 
the use of signifiers (Lacan, 1964/1977, p. 140). Or, as Lacan later formulates this dis-
tinction in his 1973 essay L’étourdit, there is an irrevocable difference between the “say-
ing” (dire) of enunciation and the “said” (dit) of the utterance (1973/2001, pp. 452–453). 
Lacan terms this process, wherein the subject of enunciation tries to represent itself but 
at the same time necessarily loses itself within language, the “fading” of the subject 
(1964/2006b, p. 709; 1964/1977, p. 208) and provides it with the following definition: 
“The subject is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, 
having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier” (1964/1977, p. 199). Thus far, how-
ever, we did not do anything more than provide a reformulation of the foregoing neo-
Kantian and phenomenological analyses within a Lacanian framework: reflection within 
and throughout the use of language thereby replaced reflection within the intentional act. 
However, what separates Lacan’s account of the preceding analyses is to be read in his 
following reformulation of the temporal and logical dynamic that inheres in the same 
process of “fading”:
Produced in the locus of the yet-to-be-situated Other, the signifier brings forth a subject from a 
being that cannot yet speak, but at the cost of freezing him. The ready-to-speak that was to be 
there—in both senses of the French imperfect “il y avait” placing the ready-to-speak an instant 
before (it was there but is no longer), but also an instant after (a few moments more and it would 
have been there because it could have been there)—disappears, no longer being anything but a 
signifier. (Lacan, 1964/2006b, p. 713)
As is often the case with Lacan, he uses an almost disorientating terminology to describe 
the process wherein the subject of enunciation is being rewritten or reflected in the form 
of its linguistic counterpart. Can we make this a bit clearer? The “ready-to-speak that was 
to be there” can be taken as roughly equivalent to the original subject of enunciation, 
whereas the subsequent condition of “freezing,” or in Natorpian terms, “mortification” 
stands for the objectified subject of the utterance. Important however is Lacan’s addi-
tional suggestion that, in this by now familiar process of ongoing “corpsification,” there 
is a fundamental illusion to be aware of: it is not that I, as a fully constituted subject, 
always-already self-consciously precede or preexist the unfolding of the signifying chain 
and concomitant process of signifying closure leading to the articulation of the “subject 
of the utterance,” and that I, as Natorp would say, become betrayed by the objectifying 
dimension of the Entäusserung implied by language use. No, in Lacan’s view, this idea 
that “there was to have been” a pristine subjectivity that is subsequently betrayed by its 
necessarily flawed translation into the “subject of the utterance” is an après-coup illusion 
of perspective. Or to put it differently: the ever elusive, nostalgic returning point of full-
blown immediacy which allegedly precedes the deplorable Entäusserung of the subject 
is for Lacan the dynamic outcome (i.e., placing it both “an instant before” as “an instant 
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after” the process of reflection) rather than the point of departure, of the fading of the 
subject.3 Furthermore, this paradoxical logic according to which the impediment to 
reflexive identification simultaneously generates that to which it is an impediment, is the 
defining feature, or perhaps the Husserlian essence, of Lacanian subjectivity as such. As 
Slavoj Žižek has noted time and again in his instructive cross-reading of Lacanian psy-
choanalysis and German Idealism, the Lacanian split subject is the constituted correlate 
of the failure of its own representation (1998, p. 263). Or to revert to Husserlian termi-
nology: the Lacanian split subject ($) or subject of the unconscious makes its home 
within the gap separating the “I that I am on the subject side” and the “I that I am as 
Object for myself,” within the irreducible difference that is operationally inscribed in the 
very surface of reflexive consciousness itself. This subject is thenceforth no longer, as it 
has traditionally been conceived, the mysterious outside or negative counterpart of con-
sciousness, residing in some sort of unfathomable depth or irrational container lurking 
beneath the smooth surface of its transcendental counterpart and secretly pulling the 
strings, but a performative dimension of subjectivity and correlated outcome of con-
sciousness’ inability to close up on itself. Or as Lacan prosaically put it:
Now if, turning the weapon of metonymy against the nostalgia that it serves, I stop myself from 
seeking any meaning beyond tautology, and if, in the name of “war is war” and “a penny’s a 
penny,” I resolve to be only what I am, how can I escape here from the obvious fact that I am 
in this very act? (1957/2006a, p. 430)
In this very performative act, where I finally renounce every effort to reflexively deter-
mine my own identity by retreating in the tautological statement “I am I,” hence simul-
taneously acknowledging that the enunciation of the first I is apparently insufficient to 
secure my own identity, is where the minimal level of temporal negativity concomitant 
of the Lacanian subject inevitably makes its entrance.
Conclusion
We started our discussion by revisiting the contemporary debate on the so-called “explan-
atory gap” between cognitive and naturalistic explanations of the mind and the first-
person dimension of subjective experience. As has been rightfully argued by several 
authors, a necessary requirement for the effort to start bridging this gap is to take this 
first-person perspective seriously in order to grasp adequately what has to be explained 
in the first place. It is precisely in this effort to get a firm grasp on the “explanandum,” 
that is, what it is like to be a subject with a first-person experience, and in the method we 
have to employ to investigate this dimension in its own right, that our discussion of 
Natorp, Husserl, and Lacan obtains its relevance.
First we have seen that Natorp points towards a dimension of subjectivity that 
eludes every effort to grasp it reflexively. Second, Husserlian phenomenology enables 
us to avoid the naturalistic objectification of subjectivity—that is, subjectivity as a 
mere object in the world which is assumed to be amenable to an unproblematic process 
of empirical individuation and description akin to the measurement of middle-sized, 
three-dimensional objects in the external world—and instead points towards subjectiv-
ity as the transcendental condition from where the empirical world is understood in the 
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first place. Furthermore and more importantly, as we have pointed out in our analysis 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, besides the explanatory gap which sepa-
rates naturalistic from phenomenological accounts of subjectivity, there is another 
“gap” which inheres within the reflexive first-person account itself.
In our opinion, it is at this precise point that a productive discussion between phenom-
enological and Lacanian accounts of subjectivity can take place. Whereas this gap within 
the reflexive surface of consciousness is traditionally understood as an epistemological 
stumbling block in our perpetual effort to “return to subjectivity,” we have seen that 
Lacan treats this gap as an ontological dimension of subjectivity which marks and deter-
mines our first-person experience as such. To designate the paradoxical nature of such a 
subject, Lacan famously coined the term “split subject,” which he, in a punning reformu-
lation of the Cartesian phrasing, characterized as follows: “I am thinking where I am not, 
therefore I am where I am not thinking” (1957/2006a, p. 430). This means above all that 
the very relation it entertains with itself must be rooted in a fundamental impossibility of 
coinciding with itself. And although this may sound like an odd definition of subjectivity, 
certainly when placed in the light of the contemporary portrayal of the naturalization 
debate (cf. infra), it must be remarked that it is also a perfectly classical one: from Hegel 
to Sartre, passing via Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the subject has long been defined 
either as an impossible being that is what it is not and is not what it is, or one for whom 
identity and difference are identical, a paradoxical entity which is at the same time a 
given and a task, and so on (Maniglier, 2012). Furthermore, we think that such a concep-
tion of subjectivity is also consistent with more recent phenomenological readings that 
emphasize the “internal differentiation” and “immanent alterity” at the very heart of the 
phenomenon of self-manifestation, at the expense of the usual portrayal of the phenom-
enological transcendental subject as a self-enclosed entity marked by an unmediated, 
pure, and apodictic self-presence (Zahavi, 1998).
So, to conclude our discussion, what then are the possible consequences of such a para-
doxical definition of the subject as, in the words of Lacan, “caught up in a constituting 
division” for the contemporary naturalization debate and the explanatory gap-argu-
ment we briefly touched upon in our introduction? Although a full exposition of this mat-
ter would exceed the limits of this article, we will nevertheless point out what we consider 
to be two of its most interesting and promising implications in terms of their potential to 
provide a new perspective on how this debate is currently understood. By this we mean, 
first, that the Lacanian reformulation of subjectivity in terms of a constitutive “mécon-
naissance,” while at a first glance seeming to undermine our very idea of subjectivity both 
as it appears to us in our most immediate self-experience and as it is traditionally concep-
tualized within the phenomenological first-person perspective, that is, as a form of inti-
mate self-acquaintance or immediate self-presence (e.g., Heidegger’s notion of 
Jemeinigkeit), actually reinforces the idea of a subjective first-person dimension that is to 
be taken seriously in its own right above and beyond certain reductionist strategies for 
which subjective appearances are indeed merely appearances. It could be argued that it is 
precisely this overly facile philosophical opposition between reality and appearance that 
figures predominantly in the contemporary naturalization debate: the former is the domain 
of neurocognitive research in that it tries to give an account of the naturalistic underpin-
nings of our manifest self-experience, whereas the latter falls entirely within the jurisdic-
tion of phenomenology as a propadeutic descriptive investigation of “the way things 
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appear to me in the way they appear to me.” Depending on philosophical allegiance, this 
peculiar distribution of the reality/appearance-doublet has been taken to mean that (a) the 
success of neurocognitive science should be measured against its ability to “save” the 
appearances as they were previously defined in the phenomenological first-person per-
spective (see Roy et al., 1999) or (b) subjectivity can be entirely reduced to the status of 
“mere seeming” so that the reality of consciousness will turn out to be independent of the 
subjective appearance of consciousness (see Dennet, 1993).
What is nevertheless shared by these two seemingly radically opposite research agen-
das is precisely the assumption that is overturned in the Lacanian approach of subjectiv-
ity, that is, the idea that subjective appearances are entirely clear for the subject of those 
appearances or, to use Searle’s formulation, that “where appearance is concerned we 
cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the appearance is the reality” 
(1992, p. 121). When we said earlier that Lacan’s contestation of such an effacement of 
the reality-appearance distinction within the very field of appearances itself, common to 
both phenomenological and reductionist approaches, actually strengthens rather than 
undermines the possibility of formulating an adequate account of subjectivity, this is 
primarily due to the fact that it can account for, and makes room for, the notion of subjec-
tive truth; that is, the way things actually seem to me even if they don’t seem that way to 
me. Indeed, it is precisely because I can be wrong about myself with respect to my very 
subjectivity, that the reduction of subjective appearance as mere appearance is warded 
off in any subsequent research effort to give a naturalistic explanation of subjectivity.
This brings us to our second and last point: if the contemporary naturalization project 
aims at closing the gap between neurocognitive levels of explanation and the first-person 
dimension of subjective experience, the somewhat transcendental question we can ask 
with regard to this effort becomes the following one: what must the ontology of our neu-
rocognitive organization be, so that subjects which are decentered from themselves can 
emerge as an effect of that level of organization? Although it may seem that such a ques-
tion is fundamentally at odds with how psychoanalysis today in general responds to—to 
use the accustomed turn of phrase—“the latest advances in brain sciences,” that is, by 
proclaiming to be the last safe haven for the subject in its non-reducible singularity against 
the objectifying clutches of all too greedy neuroscientists (for a recent example of this 
strategy, see Laurent, 2014). However, contrary to this worn-out theme of strategic sacral-
ization of the subject against the ongoing scientific disenchantment of the world, it could 
be argued that it was precisely this question which stood at the forefront of Lacan’s struc-
turalistic retour à Freud. As has been noted by Maniglier (2012), it was Lacan’s original 
idea that this paradoxical element always at a distance from itself, viz. the split subject, far 
from being only accessible through a transcendental philosophical a priori approach, 
could be approached scientifically by the then in vogue “structural methods” in the field 
of the human sciences. And although space prevents us from fully substantiating this 
claim by, for example, pointing out the similarities and divergences between neurocogni-
tive and structuralistic approaches to the question of subjectivity, it is our view that this 
question remains one of the most fruitful to investigate in the years to come.
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Notes
1. Natorp’s analysis with regard to this skewed relationship between subjectivity and objectivity 
anticipates, on a transcendental level, similar conclusions that are drawn more recently within 
the field of analytic philosophy of mind regarding the possibility of reconciling first-person 
and third-person perspectives on subjectivity by, most notably, Thomas Nagel. Like Natorp, 
Nagel argues that there will always be an aspect of subjectivity that for fundamental reasons 
will exceed the limits of objectification (1986, pp. 25–27).
2. However, as Heidegger rightfully pointed out in response to Natorp’s critique of phenom-
enological reflection, re-construction is of course itself also a form of objectivating construc-
tion and is therefore susceptible to the same criticism Natorp offers towards phenomenology 
(Heidegger, 1919/1982, pp. 104–107). For a further reading of the discussion between 
Heidegger and Natorp and the former’s methodological defense of hermeneutical intuition to 
escape this deadlock, see Zahavi (2003).
3. A possible phenomenological rejoinder to such a conception of the dynamic process that 
in Lacan’s view provides the basic structure of the subject’s self-relating is the following 
one: if we concede to Lacan’s view that there is indeed an irreducible difference between 
the subject of enunciation and the subject of the utterance, and furthermore, that this differ-
ence is constitutive of Lacanian subjectivity as such insofar as it is marked by a temporal 
self-relating negativity, how then are we able to explain the experiential phenomenon that, 
despite this fracture in the heart of subjectivity, I nonetheless remain the same throughout 
this process of failed translation? To put this differently, what remains to be explained in 
such a conception of subjectivity where it is considered the dynamic outcome of a reflex-
ive failure is twofold: (a) the irreducible “my-ness” of subjective experience that is the 
basic feature of subjectivity within a phenomenological account and (b) the experiential 
(or other) standard against which reflection is precisely to be considered as a failed reflec-
tion. This last question is akin to the critique offered by Manfred Frank in his analysis of 
Lacan in “What is Neo-Structuralism?” (1989, pp. 279–294). Without going into further 
detail, we had preferred to see Žižek, in his response to Frank’s critique, actually engage 
with this crucial issue instead of simply “staring at this line of argumentation” (see Žižek, 
1998, p. 271).
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